Passive Smart Phone Indentification and Tracking with Application Set Fingerprints by Fukumoto, Norihiro et al.
Passive Smart Phone Identification and Tracking 
with Application Set Fingerprints 
Norihiro Fukumoto 1,*, Shigehiro Ano 1 and Shigeki Goto 2 
1 Communication Network Planning Laboratory, KDDI R&D Laboratories Inc. / 2-1-15 Ohara,  
Fujimino-shi, Saitama 356-8502 JAPAN 
2 School of Fundamental Science and Engineering, Waseda University / Room 16 and 17, 5th 
Floor, Building 63, School of Fundamental Science and Engineering, WASEDA University, 3-4-
1 Ohkubo, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8555 JAPAN 
E-Mails: fukumoto@kddilabs.jp; ano@kddilabs.jp; goto@goto.info.waseda.ac.jp 
* Tel.: +81-49-278-7390; Fax: +81-49-278-7510
Abstract: Current smart phone users can be identified and tracked by fingerprint 
techniques. Fingerprint identification techniques can be used for legitimate purposes 
such as network management and traffic control to avoid excessive congestion. This 
paper proposes a user identification and tracking technique specific to smart phone 
users for supervised network management. This paper proposes the application set 
fingerprint, which is a simple set of User-Agent request-header fields in HTTP 
sessions. The application set fingerprint has three advantages, fully-passive fingerprint 
generation, potential of user trackability, and fingerprinting considering the users' 
privacy. The results show that the application set fingerprint is practically effective 
and network operators can use it for tracking smart phone users with the purpose of 
efficient network management. 
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1. Introduction
Along with the spread of smart phones, most users are becoming more privacy-conscious on
their smart phones than on their laptops [1].  Their concerns are not only imaginary fears but can 
be justified. As evidence of this, some studies point out that smart phone users can be tracked 




with a high degree of accuracy. Human mobility patterns gathered from applications that access 
users' geographic locations are sufficient to identify unique users [2]. This suggests that most 
application developers have a potential to violate the privacy of the users. The users are 
concerned with privacy not only with malicious application developers, but also with network 
service providers and Web site administrators. These network operators are technically capable 
of gathering traffic data implicitly, and there are several techniques of identifying the user from 
the traffic data. Mobile devices often have individual differences such as physical addresses, 
protocol signatures, Bluetooth signals, browser fingerprints, and email headers. They are easily 
collectable by network operators and sufficient to identify a unique user [3]. Even if the user 
pays close attention to snooping and encrypts the traffic, simple Web accesses may leave unique 
keys to identify the users on the access log. Modern Web browsers have various individual 
discriminations that could be collected by Web site administrators [4]. This means that current 
smart phone users could be identified and tracked. The identification and tracking techniques can 
also be used for legitimate purposes. One example is a network management and traffic control 
to avoid excessive congestion. If network operators could find heavy network users and identify 
them, detailed and individualized control could be provided.  
This paper proposes a user identification and tracking technique specific to smart phone users 
for supervised network management. We focused on not only the foreground data but also the 
background data which mobile applications originate, and defined the application set fingerprint 
consisting of the set of User-Agent request-header fields in the HTTP protocol. Note that User-
Agent request-header fields can be extracted without access to the HTTP message-body 
considering the privacy of the user. The new proposed method discovers that background data is 
a useful clue to identify smart phone users. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 describes related work. Section 3 explains HTTP traffic. We propose a new method in Section 
4. Section 5 discusses experimental results. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
2. Related Work 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the fingerprinting techniques. Fingerprinting is 
a common technique of identifying equipment or acquiring information about the attributes of 
the equipment. Fingerprinting utilizes various information, physical features of the equipment, 
individual differences in the physical devices, users’ habits, and communication patterns. These 
fingerprinting techniques are not exclusive and can coexist in harmony. 
The motives of fingerprinting are also various, identification of the device, user tracking, and 
network management. However, in this paper we cover only studies related to the privacy risks 
caused by traffic analysis. 
2.1. Device Fingerprint 
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There is often interindividual variability in equipment even in industrial products. Device 
fingerprinting utilizes the individual differences in equipment identification. For instance, one 
study pointed out that digital camera devices could be identified by sensor pattern noises [5]. 
Another study discussed the capability of device identification using an individual variety of 
quartz crystal clocks [6]. These device fingerprinting techniques could be applied for device 
identification, and thus user tracking. 
In addition to the variety in the hardware part of the equipment, the habit of user behavior and 
software could be fingerprinted. An example of a privacy risk caused by user behavior is the 
geographic location [2]. This problem is specific to smart phones kept by the users at all times, 
but could threaten the privacy of the smart phone users. The habit is not particular to humans, 
browsers have habits [4]. Combining Web browser measurements can realize global identifiers. 
Our study investigates device fingerprinting as a novel technique to identify smart phone 
devices and thus users with the combination of installed applications with which they access the 
Web. 
2.2. OS Fingerprint 
The fingerprint technique is useful for classifying the traffic according to the Operating 
System (OS) of the traffic originators. Each TCP stack has OS-dependent characteristics in the 
header fields, default values, and enabled options [7]. The OS fingerprint is unsuitable for user 
identification, however, it can be helpful mainly for the purpose of statistical analysis of traffic 
data, and then it carries low privacy risk. However, the result of an OS fingerprint can be 
combined with other fingerprints to enhance the accuracy of identification. 
2.3. Application Fingerprint 
Another fingerprint technique is traffic classification in accordance with protocols. One study 
shows that the traffic behavior at the transport layer without knowledge of payload data is 
sufficient to identify the applications that generate traffic [9]. Although current applications do 
not always use static well-known ports, this application fingerprint approach provides accurate 
traffic classification considering the privacy of the traffic originators. 
3. HTTP Traffic
The main idea of our study is to estimate the installed applications by inspecting the HTTP
communications and generate a fingerprint that is sufficient to identify each smart phone. 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and HTTP Secure (HTTPS) are one of the most popular 
protocols on the Internet because of their simplicity and versatility [10]. Not only Web browsers 
but also many smart phone applications communicate through HTTP protocol on the back end, 
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because HTTP protocol is a necessary and sufficient protocol for a number of objectives and 
most modern development environment supports HTTP protocol as a basic feature. We focused 
on the HTTP traffic originated by various applications installed in smart phones. 
3.1. User-Agent Request-Header Field 
HTTP protocol defines various header fields that give information about the client equipment 
and servers in plain text [11]. The User-Agent request-header field sent by client equipment 
contains multiple product tokens consisting of one or more product names and product versions 
such as: 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 2.2; en-us; Nexus One 
Build/FRF91) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile 
Safari/533.1 
Each mobile application sets its own User-Agent request-header. Thus, service providers are 
capable of estimating which application on which equipment originates the HTTP 
communication precisely. 
3.2. Background Data 
Most smart phones support multitasking features that enable background data. Many mobile 
applications originate HTTP requests to update the data periodically or in accordance with push 
notifications. This specification means that network service providers have a chance to estimate 
which applications are installed in the smart phone equipment regardless of whether the 
application is active or inactive. Background data on smart phones potentially poses a privacy 
risk because it originates silently without users notice. This study analyzes all the traffic the 
smart phone generates including the background data with the purpose of passive estimation of 
the installed applications. 
3.3. Deep Packet Inspection 
Passive analysis of User-Agent request-header fields requires a Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
technique. Network service providers are able to extract User-Agent request-header fields from 
plain HTTP traffic in principle. In fact, several DPI products support the visibility of HTTP 
header fields including User-Agent. 
4. Application Set Fingerprint 
As described in the previous section, applications installed to the smart phones originate 
HTTP sessions interactively or non-interactively. Of course, installed applications of each smart 
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phone are different. This means that the application set can be a fingerprint to identify the smart 
phone, and thus the user. 
This paper proposes a novel fingerprint technique consisting of detected applications, called 
application set fingerprint. We describe the details of application set fingerprint in this section. 
4.1. Definition of Application Set Fingerprint 
Application set fingerprint can be defined as a simple set of User-Agent request-header fields 
in HTTP sessions. The fingerprint can also be expressed as a string of sorted and concatenated 
User-Agent request-header fields for convenience sake. As mentioned in Section 3, many 
applications for smart phones use HTTP protocol on the back end, then service providers are able 
to collect User-Agent request-header fields with a DPI technique. 
User-Agent request-header fields should be collected for a definite period of time, and then 
collected User-Agent request-header fields should be sorted by identifiers at the network layer, 
usually IP addresses. In this way, an application set fingerprint is generated for each network 
layer identifier. Note that network layer identifiers are used just for temporary aggregation of 
User-Agent request-header fields. Thus, even if the smart phone renews the network layer 
identifier, the smart phone can be identified by recollection of the User-Agent request-header 
fields for a period and regeneration of the application set fingerprint. 
4.2. Advantages of Application Set Fingerprint 
There are three advantages to the proposed application set fingerprint. The first advantage is 
that the application set fingerprint is generated only from traffic data passively collected. Some 
fingerprint techniques require active measurements to collect the behavior of software. On the 
other hand, the User-Agent request-header fields can be collected completely passively. The 
second advantage is the potential of user trackability. Although most fingerprint techniques 
target identifying each item of equipment or device, sometimes the application set fingerprint can 
identify the smart phones of a particular user, because of synchronization between smart phones. 
For instance, an application installed in a smart phone can be automatically synchronized to a 
tablet owned by the same user. This means the smart phone and the tablet can be detected as 
devices owned by the same user. The third advantage is privacy. The application set fingerprint 
refers only to HTTP header fields, which means that private data in the HTTP message-body is 
not disclosed. 
4.3. Entropy of Application Set Fingerprint 
There are many applications that originate HTTP traffic for smart phones, and each 
application is updated sometimes. The User-Agent request-header field includes product version 
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information which changes on each update. Thus, the different versions of the same application 
send the different User-Agent request-header fields they provide a clue to identify the smart 
phone. For instance, the following User-Agent request-header field of Mozilla, a popular Web 
browser, includes not only the product name and environment variables but also product versions. 
Of course, the product versions change on each update and cause variations. 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 2.2; en-us; Nexus One 
Build/FRF91) AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile 
Safari/533.1 
We have HTTP-enabled application set 𝐴, and each application 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 has version variation 𝑉!. 
The distribution of the application set fingerprint can be calculated as an infinite product of the 
variations of each application. It is notable that undetected application can be treated as a kind of 
product version which should be added to 𝑉!. For example, when an application has three 
different versions such as Dalvik/1.2.0, Dalvik/1.4.0, and Dalvik/1.5.0, the version 
variation 𝑉! comes out to three. In addition, a null version is added to describe the case when that 
application is not installed. Here, the variation of application set fingerprint 𝑁 is given by: 𝑁 = 𝑉! + 1!∈! 	   (1)  
Note that the real variation of application set fingerprints is not obvious because each 
software developer names User-Agent request-header fields by their own. Thus, we suppose that 
the size is finite for convenience sake, and estimate it from collected traffic data in practice. 
When new application set fingerprint 𝑛 is received, the surprisal 𝐼 can be calculated. When 
the variation of application set fingerprints 𝑁 and the fingerprinting algorithm 𝑓! are given, we 
have a discrete probability density function 𝑃 𝑓! , 𝑛 ∈ 0,1,⋯ ,𝑁 . The surprisal   𝐼 and the 
entropy of the distribution 𝑃 𝑓!  are given by: 𝐼 𝑓! = − log! 𝑃 𝑓! 	   (2)  
𝐻 𝑓! = 𝑃 𝑓!!!!! log! 𝑃 𝑓!    (3)  
Here, the surprisal is a measure of the information content given by the new fingerprint. The 
equations simply mean that a rare application set gives more information on the identification. 
5. Experiments 
We analyzed traffic from smart phones to determine the efficiency of application set 
fingerprints. We collected 44,248 fingerprints at a smart phone network by applying the 
definition of the application set fingerprint shown in Section 4. 
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Figure 1(a) shows the frequency distribution of application set fingerprints in the double 
logarithmic plot.  The result shows that the distribution has an extremely long tail and 92.2% of 
the smart phone users have a unique application set fingerprint. In other words, network 
operators can easily make a shortlist of target users. 
Another question is how many User-Agent request-header fields are required to identify a 
unique user. Figure 1(b) depicts the frequency distribution of the number of User-Agents in a 
unique user application set fingerprint group. The result shows that a specific user can be 
identified with as few as 20 applications. 
Figure 1. (a) Frequency distribution of application set fingerprint. (b) Frequency 
distribution of number of User-Agents in unique application set fingerprint group. 
6. Conclusions
This paper proposes a new method for passive smart phone identification and tracking with
application set fingerprints. Our study suggests that network operators have a potential to 
identify current smart phone users for the purpose of smart network management.   
The primary contribution of the paper is the application set fingerprint which utilizes not only 
the foreground data but also the background data originating from mobile applications. An 
application set fingerprint is a simple set of User-Agent request-header fields in HTTP sessions. 
Most current applications for smart phones use HTTP protocol on the back end. Then, service 
providers are able to collect User-Agent request-header fields by DPI technique. The application 
set fingerprint has three advantages: it can be generated only from traffic data passively collected, 
it has potential user trackability, and it can track each user considering privacy.  
The experiment results show that the application set fingerprint is practically effective, which 
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